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Sir William Luce Memorial Fund 
 
The Sir William Luce Memorial Fund 
was established under the patronage of 
the Rt. Hon. Lord Luce GCVO, DL to 
commemorate the long and 
distinguished career of Sir William 
Luce GBE, KCMG, DL (1907-1977) in 
the Middle East during the era of the 
transfer of power.  
 
Born in 1907, Sir William was 
educated at Clifton College and Christ's 
College Cambridge, where he read 
History and Modern Languages. 
Entering the Sudan Political Service in 
1930, he served in Berber, Darfur, Blue 
Nile and Equatoria Provinces and 
finally as Adviser to the Governor-
General on Constitutional and External 
Affairs in the immediate period leading 
to the Sudan's independence in 1956. 
He was later able to bring his many 
talents to other offices.  
 
He was Governor of Aden from 1956 to 1960. From 1961 until 1966 and again from 
1970 to 1972 he was intimately connected with the Gulf area, first as Political Resident, 
based in Bahrain and then recalled from retirement - as the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary's Personal Representative for Gulf Affairs.  
 
Sir William was held in the greatest respect and affection by the peoples of the Middle 
East, and among the many tributes paid to him by prominent Arab statesmen on his death 
in 1977 were:- ‘He served the Arab World with the same zeal and dedication as his own 
country' and 'He understood our problems and aspirations.'  
 
The object of the Fund is to support the study of those parts of the Arab world to which 
Sir William devoted his working life, to stimulate research, discussion and publication 
about them and to encourage collaboration and co-operation between institutions of 
learning, specialising in the places which aroused Sir William's own interest. An annual 
Sir William Luce Fellowship is tenable jointly in the University of Durham’s Institute for 
Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies and Trevelyan College.  
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Sudan: Political transitions past and present 
 
Peter Woodward 
 
Sir William Luce Memorial Fellow 2008 
 
Introduction 
 
This lecture marks the end of the 50
th
 anniversary year of the founding of the University’s 
acclaimed Sudan Archive by Richard Hill.  Scholars ever since have had reason to be 
grateful to Richard for his vision in setting up the archive: I know of no comparable 
archive in Britain on a single country in Africa.  I would also like to pay tribute to the 
archivists who have maintained and developed it with a commitment far beyond the call 
of duty, particularly Lesley Forbes and Jane Hogan.  
 
I wanted to make use of the archive to research the role of Bill Luce in Sudan’s transition 
1953-1956 from imperial rule to independence as a multi-party democracy.  I interviewed 
Sir William, as he became in 1956 shortly after leaving the country, when researching my 
PhD in the early 1970s and as well as entertaining me royally he also left me intrigued to 
learn more of his own role.
1
  At our interview Sir William did not rely simply on his 
memory, but occasionally retired to his study to consult his papers before answering 
specific questions.  It was very helpful, but I have long wanted to see what he went out to 
read, especially his personal correspondence with successive Sudan Agents in London.
2
 
My major reason for doing so was that it appeared to me then that Luce had been a 
central figure in the transition process, during which he served as Adviser on 
Constitutional and External Affairs to the British Governor-General.  He served under 
two Governor’s-General: Sir Robert Howe, who had arrived in Sudan in 1947 but spent 
much of the transition period out of the country due to his wife’s ill health, before retiring 
in 1955; and Sir Knox Helm, Howe’s replacement for the last few months before 
independence, who had no background in Sudan.  As a result much was left for Luce to 
handle. Later writers have come to a similar conclusion to mine regarding his importance: 
Martin Daly writes in Imperial Sudan, ‘His [Luce’s] role in the politics of self 
government, while largely behind the scenes, was crucial to the outcome’;3 and in The 
End of Empire in the Middle East Glen Balfour-Paul paid fulsome tribute to his work not 
only in Sudan but in Aden and the Gulf as well.
4
  
 
 
Four transitions 
 
Much of the world will have some knowledge of what is going on in Sudan.  It has been 
difficult to avoid awareness of Darfur, which has been called in recent times the world’s 
                                                 
 
1
 Sir William told me that shortly before he left Sudan he asked the Foreign Office in London if it wished 
him to ship confidential documents from the Governor-General’s Palace in Khartoum. When it declined 
he had to reluctantly hold a bonfire in a corner of the Palace gardens. 
2
 The Sudan Agent was a senior member of the Sudan Political Service based in London to act on behalf 
of the government in Khartoum. Luce wrote regularly with informal updates on developments in Sudan. 
3
 Daly, M.W., Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934-56, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p.374. 
4
 Balfour-Paul, Glen, The End of Empire in the Middle East, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p.43. 
 2 
worst humanitarian crisis.  Some will probably know that even while conflict was 
escalating in Darfur in 2003, peace negotiations were proceeding between the dominant 
National Congress Party (NCP) in the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the powerful 
rebel movement in the Southern Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement 
(SPLA/M), which resulted in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
in January 2005.  Following the signing of the CPA Sudan is currently experiencing its 
fourth transition to multi-party democracy, with elections scheduled by July 2009; to be 
followed in 2011 by a referendum in the South on continued unity or full separation.  
 
Two of those four transitions, in 1964-5 and 1985-6, were comparatively brief, lasting 
approximately one year each. They both took place following essentially spontaneous 
popular uprisings against the then military regimes in power: the ‘October Revolution’ of 
1964 against Abboud’s regime that had seized power in 1958; and the rising of April 
1985 against Nimeiri’s regime that had started with a coup in 1969. They are 
remembered proudly, for such uprisings against the military require bravery and 
determination. Both uprisings were unexpected, and partly in consequence there had been 
little preparation for power and the interim governments that emerged were to achieve 
little by way of change, contributing to a sense of frustration at lost opportunities.
5
 
Instead the traditional elitist political parties of northern Sudan, the Umma Party and the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) re-captured the initiative from the street where radical 
ideas of the progressive ‘modern forces’ were being heard, to return fairly swiftly to 
multi-party democracy under the Westminster-style constitution pertaining when Sudan 
became independent on 1 January 1956.
6
  Essentially Sudan had twice gone from military 
rule to the status quo ante: more a restoration than a transition to a viable multi-party 
system since it meant returning to one with clear failings. The system was based on a 
centralised unitary state that failed to extend a share in power to the geographically 
remoter parts of the country (now often referred to as the ‘marginalised areas’) especially 
the south where the resort to conflict, first seen before independence in August 1955, had 
turned into guerrilla war that continued during and after these two transitions. At the 
same time the balance between the dominant northern political parties ensured a return to 
unstable coalition government, which had become the norm for elected governments 
following independence.
7
  As a result the elected governments were unable to stop the 
civil wars in the south, or deliver on development.  In frustration there were many people 
who welcomed the military coups of 1958 and 1969 in the hope of more decisive and 
effective government. 
     
However the transition which is now under way resembles less those two experiences of 
1964-65 and 1985-86 than that of 1953-56 as Sudan moved from the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium to full independence, a comparison of which some Sudanese are well 
aware. These two transitions were not the result of popular uprisings, rather they were 
‘pacted transitions’ in which major actors in Sudanese politics were forced by changing 
political balances and circumstances to negotiate with each other.  The 1953-56 transition 
was a negotiated process involving the major actors in Sudanese politics at that time: 
                                                 
 
5
 There was a Roundtable Conference on the South following the October Revolution, but it came to little. 
6
 The constitution itself was regarded as interim with the expectation that a permanent constitution would 
be written after the decision on sovereignty had been taken. In fact no such constitution was written 
during the periods of multi-party rule. 
7
 Woodward, Peter, ‘Is Sudan Governable? Some thoughts on the experience of liberal democracy and 
military rule’, Bulletin, British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 13, No 2, pp.137-149, 1987. 
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Britain, Egypt and the major Sudanese political parties, especially the Umma Party and 
the then National Unionist Party (NUP), the latter of which had been boycotting the 
earlier British-led constitutional steps towards self-government.
8
  The Anglo-Egyptian 
Agreement of February 1953, which laid out the groundwork and started the transition, 
was essentially the result of the manoeuvring of Egypt and the Sudanese to oust Britain, 
but in accepting the inevitable it, like the CPA in 2005, laid down a transitional process 
with an open conclusion: not as now the possible separation of the south from the north 
but a decision over whether Sudan wished to be united with Egypt or independent.
9
  
   
The two transitions are also comparable in that they involve multi-party elections for new 
democratic governments: in 1953 for the first time; and in 2009 for the fourth. Both 
transitions have had at their heart the issue of Sudan’s sovereignty, with a process put in 
place for the people to arrive in the end at a decision regarding it. A number of other 
issues are also common to both transitional periods.  The ‘neutrality’ of the civil service 
is important for the ‘free and fair’ judgement of the people and has been perceived as 
requiring changes in both transitions.  Issues of resources have also had to be addressed 
in the course of both: the sharing of water between Egypt and Sudan became a factor in 
the first transition; while oil fields and oil revenues are relevant to the present one. The 
agreements that have launched the transitions have also contributed to the rise of conflict. 
Finally the international community has had both an official and an unofficial role in both 
transitions. 
 
 
Sovereignty 
 
Sudan’s sovereignty had long been an issue of rivalry and ambiguity. Following the 
invasion by Egypt’s ruler, Mohammed Ali, in 1820 which began the territorial 
consolidation of what is now Africa’s largest country, Sudan was often referred to as 
under Turco-Egyptian rule. ‘Turco’ because Egypt was legally part of the Ottoman 
Empire, and ‘Egyptian’ because the government there was effectively autonomous. The 
Mahdist revolt drove out Turco-Egyptian rule with the fall of Khartoum in 1885, but 
there was no international recognition for the Mahdiyya as the state then established has 
become known. The Anglo-Egyptian re-conquest, culminating in the Battle of 
Omdurman in 1898, established Condominium rule, but was in fact British dominated.
10
 
Egypt however continued to regard Sudan as a territory legally under the Egyptian crown 
which had been in rebellion during the Mahdiyya, but to which Egyptian sovereignty had 
been restored in 1898.  
 
After World War II the rivalry of Egypt and Britain was intensified, especially as 
Sudanese nationalism developed. The latter however was split, especially between the 
followers of the patrons of the two major parties. While the Mahdists, backers of the 
Umma Party, were pro-British because of the latter’s perceived wish to keep Egypt out of 
Sudan, the Khatmiyya sect, supporters of the NUP, proclaimed themselves for unity with 
                                                 
 
8
 The NUP later became the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). 
9
 Woodward, Peter, Condominium and Sudanese Nationalism, (London, Rex Collins, 1979). 
10
  Condominium was then a unique status devised by Lord Cromer, Britain’s Consul-General in Egypt, 
and was deliberately ambiguous. Britain’s leadership of the re-conquest of Sudan entitled it, in Cromer’s 
view, to effectively control Sudan, while minimising the offence given to the Khedive in Egypt. The 
preamble to the Agreement referred both to Britain’s rights by way of conquest and the re-conquest of 
former provinces of Egypt. Cromer, Earl of, Modern Egypt, Vol.II, London, 1908, p.118. 
 4 
Egypt.  As long as Egypt continued to claim Sudan and the British in Sudan, in effect the 
independently-minded Sudan Political Service (SPS), resisted with the support of the 
Umma Party, there could be no resolution of Sudan’s sovereignty.11  However, in July 
1952 a coup in Egypt brought a military regime with a new approach.  In overthrowing 
the monarchy it said that Egypt’s claim was withdrawn and the issue would now be 
decided by the Sudanese; to which all Sudanese parties, including the hitherto pro-British 
Umma Party, responded positively thereby totally undercutting the position of the SPS. 
Shorn of Sudanese support, the British government had little option other than to agree 
with Egypt producing the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953 by which the issue of 
sovereignty would be decided by the Sudanese people at the end of the transitional 
period.  
    
The Agreement was not without its critics including many in the SPS who felt that the 
British government had betrayed the Sudanese to Egypt, and that the latter would work to 
finally re-gain the control lost in the previous century.
12
  Sir James Robertson, the 
outgoing Civil Secretary, wrote, ‘Unless a miracle happens, Sudan will be swallowed up 
by Egypt’.13  Luce, however, was determined to do his utmost to prevent it, writing, ‘It is 
inconceivable to me that we should admit defeat and write the Sudanese off as an 
Egyptian Province. It’s going to be a tough fight.’14  However, he himself appeared from 
the outset to be confident of the outcome writing privately in December 1953 that, ‘I still 
firmly believe that the Sudan will get its independence in the end’.15  It would be 
achieved not by British pressure but as he put it, ‘the logic of the situation and events’.16  
    
One event that was to do much to shape the situation came with the elections of 1954. 
Many of the SPS felt that a victory for the pro-independence Umma Party in the elections 
would help their cause, and Luce himself expected it as did most of his colleagues. But 
for him at least the surprising victory instead of the pro-union with Egypt NUP was less a 
source of disillusionment than a wake-up call.  From then on it was clear to him that a 
policy of steering the NUP towards independence ‘was more likely to achieve H.M. 
Government’s aim for the Sudan’.17  An Umma victory, he realised, would have driven 
the NUP further into the arms of Egypt; but if a victorious NUP could be steered away 
from Egypt, then the opposition Umma Party would go along with it.  Luce told me that 
an important link had been his relationship with Mubarak Zarouq, the young and able 
Minister of Communications and Leader of the House of Representatives. Howe and 
Luce were also instrumental in arranging for Ismail Azhari, the newly elected Prime 
Minister, to make an early visit to London where he was warmly received.  It helped to 
overcome the initial distrust on both sides, which led Azhari to remark later, ‘My feeling 
when greeting him [the Governor-General] for the first time was a feeling that the man 
                                                 
 
11
 The Sudan Political Service was responsible not to the Colonial Office but to the Foreign Office, 
officially reporting through the British Embassy in Cairo but often acting with a large measure of 
autonomy.  
12
 One critic brought Luce what he described as ‘a little light relief’. ‘My son, Richard, who is a student of 
Sudan affairs, decided to write a letter to The Times which tore everything to strips’, however his mother, 
Margaret Luce, phoned the paper to stop it. Luce concluded, ‘One’s children are rather hair-raising at 
times.’ Luce to Davies, 12 July 1954, SAD 828/7/53. 
13
 Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire, p.39. 
14
 Luce to Davies, Sudan Agent, 5 May 1953, SAD 829/9/25. 
15
 Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire, p.43. 
16
 Luce to Davies, 30 Jan. 1954, SAD 828/6/27. 
17
 Daly, Imperial Sudan, p.367. 
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whose hand I seized would respect the constitution and fulfil the terms of the 
Agreement’.18  
 
By 1954 Luce quoted Azhari as saying in conversation with him that,  
 
You must not suppose that anyone in his senses, having thrown off one master 
would put himself under a new master. Most people in the country have for 
some time felt that it would be easier and more practical to ally themselves 
temporarily with Egypt in order to get rid of the British. But that did not mean 
that they wished to put themselves under the Egyptians.
19
 
 
It was also clear that Howe and Luce had to contend not only with a new Sudanese 
government, but also with the Foreign Office in London and the British Embassy in 
Cairo. With agreement with the new Egyptian government on the future security of the 
Suez Canal at the top of its agenda, the Embassy in Cairo sought, ‘a new and more 
sympathetic look at Egyptian aspirations in the Sudan’; which few doubted would mean a 
sustained campaign to persuade the Sudanese towards eventual union at the end of the 
transitional process. In the Foreign Office in London and in the British Embassy in Cairo 
there were feelings, at times at least, that the SPS was not as politically sensitive as it 
should be in the situation; Daly even quotes one Foreign Office official as wanting to 
‘clear out the whole cry-baby lot’.20  
   
Luce and his colleagues feared that the Foreign Office would be swayed by the Embassy 
towards concessions, and he did his utmost to persuade London of the dangers of union 
between the two countries; in this he was supported by the belligerent hostility towards 
Egypt of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, veteran of a cavalry charge during the Battle 
of Omdurman, who now suggested sending British reinforcements up the Nile again, a 
prospect too much even for the most die-hard members of the SPS.
21
  However, with time 
and persuasion Howe and Luce were successful in winning the Foreign Office to their 
view rather than that of the Embassy, with Luce writing gleefully in December 1954 that 
the Foreign Office had delivered the ‘coup de grace to Cairo’s ideas about appeasing the 
Egyptians’.22  However, they were less successful in their endeavours, ‘to extract from 
the British Government a public assurance of its readiness to afford moral, material and 
financial assistance to the Sudan after self-determination’.23 
    
The Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1953 charted a course which proved as taxing as 
expected to maintain. It was intended initially that there would be two elections, one to 
start the self-governing period, and another to be held before the decision on sovereignty 
which would then be taken by the newly-elected Assembly.  However by mid-1955 it 
was becoming clear that in the light of a shift in sentiment away from Egypt, there was 
growing impatience for the decision on sovereignty to be taken.  
 
By August Sayed Ali al-Mirghani, leader of the influential Khatmiyya sect backing the 
NUP, was suggesting a plebiscite rather than an election as the mechanism for the 
decision, a move to which the Assembly agreed on 29 August. But by October Prime 
                                                 
 
18
 Morning News, 7 March 1955. 
19
 Luce, Note, SAD 828/6/45. 
20
 Daly, Imperial Sudan, p.374. 
21
 Luce to Davies, 5 May 1953, SAD 829/9/25. 
22
 Luce to Lampen, Sudan Agent, 29 Dec.1954, SAD/828/9/35. 
23
 Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire, p.44. 
 6 
Minister Azhari was saying that the existing Assembly could take the decision. Such 
speculation not only added to the manoeuvrings of Sudanese politicians, but also those of 
the co-domini. British officials in Khartoum had been suggesting that Britain make a 
unilateral declaration of Sudan’s independence, only for the British Embassy in Cairo to 
pour cold water on it. Egypt however countered with a proposal for a plebiscite and an 
election, with the new Assembly then taking the decision in accordance with the wishes 
shown by the plebiscite. Britain resisted at first, but a further Anglo-Egyptian Agreement 
along these lines was signed on 10 December. Unbeknown to the co-domini it was to be 
their last act as such, for the matter was effectively not in their hands but those of 
Sudanese politicians and after some back-stage negotiations on 15 December Azhari 
slipped out the fact that independence would be declared in the Assembly ‘next 
Monday’.24  Thus it was, and the British and Egyptians had no option other than to accept 
it and then seek to chart their respective relations with the newly independent country. 
 
While the first transitional process answered the question of sovereignty of Sudan in 
relation to Egypt, the whole process said nothing directly about the southern Sudan.  
Luce, who had been briefly governor of Equatoria in the far south, spoke of the region as 
dogged by historical bad luck.  Exploited in the nineteenth century, especially for slaves, 
in the inter-war years of the twentieth century Britain sought to chart a course of isolation 
for the south, only to find it had to be abandoned in 1947 in the face of northern Sudanese 
nationalism and its desire to incorporate the south fully into the country.
25
  In the 
following years this led to worsening relations between the two regions, as Luce put it, 
‘Thus on 1st of January 1954, the Sudan entered into full self-government in an 
atmosphere of extreme distrust and fear on the part of Southerners towards the North.’ 26 
Far from solving the problem of relations between north and south the situation worsened 
during the transition. The issue of the status of the south was raised by southern 
politicians, to be met with talk of later consideration of federation, but not the possible 
issue of sovereignty.  Instead the first violent clashes occurred with the Southern Mutiny 
of August 1955; and it was to take long years of further conflict before the sovereignty 
issue finally arose.
27
 
 
The issue grew slowly from 1994, when, following yet another round of failed peace 
talks, a regional organisation, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development 
(IGAD), came up with a Declaration of Principles (DOP).  It envisaged, that in the event 
of the Sudan government not agreeing to end sharia (Islamic law), first introduced in 
1983, returning Sudan to a secular state as demanded by the SPLA, then the south should 
have the right of full self-determination.
28
  When serious negotiations started in 2002, this 
                                                 
 
24
 Constituent Assembly, Proceedings, 15 Dec. 1955. 
25
 Woodward, Peter, ‘The South in Sudanese Politics’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.16, No.3, 1980, 
p.178-92. 
26
 Luce to Maddocks, 1 Nov.1955, SAD 829/6/1. P. Maddocks was an official in Northern Nigeria who 
had written to Luce about the handling of relations between Muslim and Christian societies in 
decolonising situations. Luce went on to say, ‘Eschew all sentimental thought of human zoos or 
museums, anthropological paradises, the joys of life in the raw, etc.’ 
27
 Johnson, Douglas, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, (Oxford, James Currey, 2003). 
28
 IGAD was set up by eight countries of the Horn and East Africa following the famines of the 1980s. In 
recent years it has been the regional organisation responsible for the peace processes in both Sudan and 
Somalia. 
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was the first major issue and was enshrined in the Machakos Protocol of that year, which 
was followed by a series of protocols on different issues culminating in the CPA of 2005.  
 
Like the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement before it, the CPA envisages two consultation 
processes, the second of which is to be decisive with regard to sovereignty. The first is a 
national election for an Executive President, the National Assembly and the Assembly in 
the South; as well as for state elections for what is now, with the establishment of the 
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), an asymmetric federal system. The elections are 
scheduled to take place by July 2009, but first require the staging of a national census (no 
accepted census having taken place since independence), as well as negotiations over the 
elections themselves including the partial use of proportional representation and the 
inclusion of seats reserved for women. The second consultation, the one on sovereignty, 
will be the referendum in Southern Sudan in which the Southerners alone will decide 
whether there will be one country or two separate states. (The parties to the CPA agreed 
to work to make the former attractive, but it is the peoples’ will which will be decisive.) 
Whether the elections and the referendum will proceed as agreed in the CPA is yet to be 
seen, but the earlier transition of 1953-56 suggests that there may be some twists and 
turns along the way.  
   
The eventual CPA was conceived at Machakos in 2002 with the sovereignty issue at its 
centre, and, as mentioned, is scheduled to end with the referendum in 2011. A nine year 
transition seems a long time, but it should be remembered that the issue of Sudan’s 
sovereignty has been around in one shape or another for over 100 years. 
    
Just as shifting political relations were significant in the first transition, so since 
Machakos in 2002 comparable tensions have emerged. The CPA created a new 
Government of National Union (GNU) with majority NCP membership and minority 
SPLM participation; as well as the new GOSS in which the SPLM was similarly installed 
as dominant with the NCP in the minority. With elections and the referendum judged to 
require considerable time, there would be a prolonged period for political jockeying in 
both governments which could affect the whole process of the implementation of the 
CPA.  
    
At a personal level the negotiating of the CPA was seen to have been helped by the 
relations between Vice-President Ali Osman Taha and SPLA leader John Garang. But 
Garang was killed in a helicopter crash in 2005, while Taha’s star appeared to wane 
somewhat. Instead the top security figures appeared ever more significant in the NCP led 
by Nafie Ali Nafie. In the South Garang was succeeded by his former deputy, the less 
experienced Salva Kiir Mayardit. There were also disagreements within both the NCP 
and the SPLM, with some in both camps favouring separation and others eventual unity.  
Tensions rose to the point in October 2007 where the SPLM withdrew from the GNU in 
protest against various problems with the implementation of the CPA. By the end of the 
year the SPLM had returned following concessions by the NCP, but the experience 
illustrated how fragile are the relations between the two main parties to the CPA.  Those 
relations will in turn influence the sovereignty issue in 2011: while the referendum will 
put the decision in the hands of all Southerners, the positions adopted by the major 
parties, especially the SPLM, are likely to be significant. 
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‘Free and fair’ elections 
 
Throughout Africa in the past twenty years the fresh wave of democratization has been 
accompanied by discussions of ‘free and fair’ elections.  Indeed if they are not so 
perceived, elections will lose their legitimacy both in the eyes of the parties contesting 
them and the electorate at large.   
 
In the first transition this issue came down largely to the implementation of Sudanization 
as embodied in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953, and it was another area in which 
Luce was a major figure. Sudanese politicians, especially NUP, urged the rapid 
replacement of British officials, doubting their presence could allow for a ‘free and fair’ 
atmosphere for the elections as the transition process moved towards a decision on the 
issue of relations with Egypt.  Many British officials were very resentful of this treatment 
which they thought showed scant gratitude for their service, though the pill was sugared 
with generous compensation. Luce, however, recognised the political significance of 
cooperating in the rapid transfer, regarding that as more helpful for British objectives 
than the loss of government efficiency that was likely to result from rapid Sudanization. 
As he put it in January 1954,  
 
The British in the Sudan have had it, and if there is to be any salvation for the 
country, it must come through Sudanese themselves. Perhaps the best way we can 
help the Sudanese to help themselves from Egyptian domination is to remove 
ourselves as quickly as possible and to face them fairly and squarely with the 
Egyptian menace.
29
 
 
At the same time the withdrawal of British officials and strict adherence to the Anglo-
Egyptian agreement would help improve relations between the small band of British who 
remained and the new Sudanese government and thus help with a British policy of 
seeking Sudan’s full independence.30 
    
At the time of the CPA in 2005 the issue of the state’s personnel arose again.  It was 
widely believed that the NCP had placed many supporters in senior positions in the civil 
service and that it would be necessary to address this in some way.  The CPA itself was 
particularly concerned for a greater representation of Southerners within the national civil 
service (in addition of course to their posts in the new GOSS). Reports indicate that there 
has indeed been some recruitment into a number of ministries in spite of the limited pool 
of qualified Southerners after so many years of devastating conflict.  In addition other 
political parties, especially the old northern parties such as the Umma Party and the DUP, 
have been critical of what they perceive as the stranglehold of the NCP on positions of 
power.  In particular they are concerned that the NCP’s dominance in the state will 
facilitate patronage which will be used for electoral advantage.  Indeed allegations of 
such behaviour, especially by federal state governors who owe their positions to the NCP, 
have frequently been made.  There have been some concessions, however it has long 
been noted that the NCP is adept at smoke and mirrors’ tactics and thus appointments of 
newcomers to senior posts will not necessarily ensure a significant dilution of the party’s 
grip on power, especially in areas it regards as key, such as security, energy and 
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 Luce spent a good deal of his time dealing with matters such as the pension and compensation 
arrangements for departing British officials, and their re-employment opportunities in Britain and 
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in particular. 
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finance.
31
  However, while the need for change has been recognised if the processes of 
the CPA are to be accorded legitimacy, and some has taken place, it is unlikely that there 
will be any transformation of personnel to compare with the wholesale Sudanization 
programme of 1953-55. 
    
The discussion of ‘free and fair’ elections has also included several other issues. 
Opposition political parties have argued that there are a number of laws on the statute 
book which are inimical to a free contest.
32
  The need for a new census, so vital to the 
holding of elections, has also caused controversy. The SPLM in particular has wanted the 
census to include ethnic origin and religious affiliation, though this was rejected and the 
question asked on the form concerned only previous residence. Security issues were also 
such that parts of the South and Darfur posed significant problems for the census which 
was finally conducted in April 2008. Overall problems of agreeing what is ‘free and fair’ 
delayed the finalising of the election law until July 2008. In addition the failure to 
demarcate the border between North and South is creating problems for the designation 
of geographical electoral constituencies.  
 
 
Resources 
 
The issue of sovereignty in particular gives rise to issues of shared resources.  But it is 
not simply a matter of waiting until a decision has been made and dividing the resources 
if separation is the outcome: rather the resource issue has to be recognised and addressed 
at an early stage in the process, and the impact of doing so can then become an important 
factor in the outcome.  
    
In 1953-56 there were differences over Egypt’s wish to build the High Dam at Aswan 
and the necessity for a new Nile Waters agreement between Egypt and Sudan to replace 
the one of 1929.  Water was a significant issue for Sudan since its main export was 
cotton, which grew largely in irrigated areas and which it hoped to expand. Negotiations 
had started following the election of the new government in Sudan in 1953, but they had 
proved very difficult.  Indeed the eventual failure after openly rancorous exchanges 
between the two parties contributed to the NUP government’s drift away from union with 
Egypt.  Britain was involved since it, as well as the USA and the World Bank, was to 
contribute to the intended loan for the dam.  The Bank finally decided not to assist the 
financing of the dam. In his correspondence with the Foreign Office Luce was 
particularly adamant about Sudan’s position, ‘I must emphasise again that this is not a 
question of obstinacy or obstruction on the part of the Sudan; it is a matter which vitally 
affects the welfare of future generations of Sudanese.’33  And when he was asked the 
likely effect in Sudan of Britain supporting the financing of the dam through the World 
Bank he replied that it would be disastrous if no Egyptian-Sudanese agreement was in 
place.  Their eventual lack of agreement on the Nile waters was one of a number of 
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 Following the return of the SPLM to the GNU in December 2007 it was noted that the powerful NCP 
Minister of Energy, Awad al-Jaz, was switched: he was made Minister of Finance. 
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factors contributing to the World Bank’s decision not to fund the dam, which in turn led 
to Nasser’s decision to nationalise the Suez Canal: it was a step in events that were to 
have a major impact on the course of the Middle East as a whole. 
 
While cotton had been the mainstay of Sudan’s economy during the first transition, 
during the present one the central resource issue is oil which Sudan began exporting in 
1999.
34
 The CPA included agreement on equitable sharing of wealth to promote 
development of the South and other ‘marginalised’ and war-affected areas. This centred 
on the agreement that revenues from oil in the South be distributed fairly between the 
National Government and GOSS.  At the time of the SPLM’s withdrawal from the GNU 
in 2007 major complaints were that oil revenues were shrouded in secrecy, and that the 
revenues due to GOSS had not been paid. This was particularly important at a time when 
the lack of a ‘peace dividend’ within the South was a constant and widely expressed 
complaint.
35
 
 
The position of much of Sudan’s oil in the central border region between North and 
South has also heightened the issue of where precisely the border lies. The CPA 
established mechanisms to resolve the border issue, but those mechanisms have proved 
difficult especially in the crucial oil-rich area of Abyei. Indeed one of the international 
experts on the commission appointed to decide on the border (the report of which was not 
accepted by the President and his NCP advisors) has argued that Abyei, and behind it the 
oilfields issue, could be the breaking point for the whole CPA.
36
  The dangers were 
highlighted in May 2008 when armed clashes took place between national government 
forces and those of the GOSS in Abyei town itself.
37
 
 
 
Conflict 
 
As mentioned, both transitional periods were to be over a considerable period of time 
giving rise to the possibility of unforeseen developments.  In the event both agreements 
were to have implications in terms of intensifying recognised problems to the point of 
outright conflict.  
    
In the first transition it was the south that was to explode into an outburst of violence in 
August 1955, known as the Southern Mutiny; and in the crisis it brought on Luce was 
once more a central figure.  As Deputy Governor of Equatoria, in the far south, in 1950-
51 he had personal experience of the problems of the region.  He was also aware of the 
concerns in the south about the constitutional developments that had created a unitary 
state in Sudan rather than some form of special status for the region, a view which had 
long been canvassed by leading SPS officials there as well as some amongst the small 
group of southern politicians.  In addition there was fear in the south at the impact of 
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 Woodward, Peter, ‘Politics and Oil in Sudan’, in Omeje, K (ed), Extractive Economies and Conflict in 
the Global South, (Aldershot, Ashgate 2008,) p. 107-18. 
35
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Sudanization with British officials being replaced by Northern staff with little or no 
experience of the region.  It was also clear that Egyptian agents in the south, where Egypt 
had Nile monitoring stations, had by 1955 started contributing to anti-Northern feeling, 
apparently in the hope of restoring Egypt’s waning position with the NUP government 
through a threatening alliance with discontented southerners.
38
  But Luce, like many 
others, had not foreseen the possibility of violence in the south that broke out in August 
1955, instead commenting shortly before hand that ‘concerted trouble’ was ‘very 
remote’.39  
 
However when the mutiny did break out amongst southern units of the Sudan army in 
Equatoria it was Luce, together with Mubarak Zarroug as government representative, 
who flew to the south to assess the situation and seek the surrender of the mutineers. 
Meanwhile Salah Salem, the member of Egypt’s Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC) responsible for Sudan, saw Britain’s Ambassador, Humphrey Trevelyan, in Cairo 
and called for a joint force of the co-domini to be sent immediately to the south to be 
placed between northern and southern Sudanese troops.
40
  It was this that Luce felt would 
be disastrous and he strongly advocated that Sudanese forces from the North should be 
sent to deal with the situation: anything else could undermine the whole process outlined 
in the Agreement, as well as damaging Britain’s developing relations with the NUP 
government aimed at encouraging it towards independence from Egypt. ‘I am 
convinced’, he wrote, ‘that the presence of British and Egyptian troops in the South now 
(and once there, it would be difficult to withdraw them in the near future) would destroy 
all hope of any settlement between the North and the South in the foreseeable future.’41 
This cool response was upheld by the Foreign Office, the Embassy in Cairo, and, most 
importantly Prime Minister Azhari: it was to be a vital decision in reinforcing the NUP’s 
still tentative confidence in Britain and growing distance from Egypt. 
 
The parallel in the current transition with the conflict in the south is the crisis in Darfur. 
At the time of the signing of the Machakos Protocol in 2002, the scale of the conflict that 
was to arise in Darfur was not foreseen.
42
  It was known that the situation was difficult 
with rising tension and some violence, but the scale and initial success of the revolt of 
early 2003, led by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), took most people by surprise; as did the scale and ferocity of the 
government’s response, especially through the backing of the janjaweed militias.  Just as 
the Southern Mutiny in 1955 owed something to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, 
especially the prospect of a rapid change in the south as a result of Sudanization with 
northern officials replacing British ones and Egypt’s attempts at disruption, so it appears 
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that the negotiations from 2002 to 2005 leading to the CPA had an effect on the potential 
Darfur rebels. Feeling excluded by a process that seemed as if it might effectively carve 
up Sudan between the NCP and the SPLA/M the message to some at least was that the 
gun was the route to the negotiating table.
43
  In addition there were links between the 
SPLA and the SLA which the former calculated would help to increase pressure on the 
NCP during the negotiating of the various protocols from 2002 to late 2004.  At the same 
time the government appears to have been influenced by the scale of the concessions it 
had had to make to the south in the CPA and was determined to resist new pressures in 
the north, beginning with Darfur.  
 
The international community was slow to respond, not least because of concern that 
turning attention to Darfur might weaken concentration on the implementation of the 
CPA. But as the situation in Darfur worsened and became a cause of growing concern at 
the UN action had to be taken.  As the crisis has continued, with major peace talks in 
Abuja in April 2006 having failed, it has inevitably led to speculation about its possible 
implications for the CPA.
44
  One influence already detected has been its contribution to 
differences within the GNU. The SPLM became increasingly opposed to the NCP’s 
obstruction of UN involvement in Darfur, and it was one factor in its withdrawal from the 
GNU for three months at the end of 2007.  At the same time one of the factions in Darfur, 
the JEM, has started talking about wanting secession; and in May 2008 went so far as to 
stage an unsuccessful attempt on the capital itself.  
 
While Darfur is not directly related to developments within the south, events in the 
former could have an influence on feelings in the southern region in the run up to both 
the national elections and the referendum.  Certainly the situation in Darfur has created a 
greater problem than the one encountered in the south in 1955, and which was so 
expeditiously handled, in the short term at least: yet in the long run the Southern Mutiny 
was to be seen as the start of decades of conflict, leading to an estimated two million 
deaths.  It is to be hoped that however bad the situation is now in Darfur it will be less 
than 50 years before a solution is found.
45
 
 
 
International Community 
 
A further point of comparison between the two transitions lies in the formal and informal 
roles of the international community.  The first one involved the co-domini themselves in 
making the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953.  Following the agreement three 
international commissions were established to oversee aspects of the transition, intended 
in effect to bind the hands of the British officials: these were the Governor-General’s 
Commission to oversee his work; the Electoral Commission to supervise the national 
elections; and the Sudanization Commission to determine which posts could threaten the 
‘neutrality’ of the transition and replace their British occupants with Sudanese.  
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The CPA was a Sudanese agreement rather than an international one, but nevertheless 
had a significant international input.  At a regional level the Inter-Governmental 
Authority for Development (IGAD) was active in promoting the whole process; while at 
the wider international level Britain, Norway and the US (known as the Troika) played a 
direct role in setting it up and supporting the lengthy negotiations. As part of the CPA 
itself an Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) was established with 
international participation. The CPA also includes international supervision of elections 
and the referendum in the South; as well as international involvement in the Abyei 
Boundary Commission (ABC).  In addition, the security situation involved the 
establishment of a UN peace support operation for the South and the border areas while 
the SPLA was being transformed into the army of the South, Sudan’s national army was 
withdrawn from the region and a joint force was also established.  The Darfur crisis led to 
further international involvement.  It was the African Union (AU), rather than the UN, 
which first stepped in there sending a small military force known as the African Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS).  However when that proved inadequate there was eventual UN 
agreement in 2007 to deploy a larger hybrid force, the United Nations African Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID). 
    
As well as the formal involvement of the international community in the two transitions 
there were ongoing shifts in international politics.  In 1955 Egypt took its first step 
towards involvement with the Eastern bloc in the Cold War, most notably with the 
signing of the ‘Czech’ arms deal.  It was a move which strengthened US as well as 
British resolve to encourage Sudan towards independence.  The present transition has 
been affected by new rivalry, especially China’s push for resources including Sudan’s oil. 
As the situation in Darfur deteriorated and the US and Britain became more vocal at the 
UN with calls for international sanctions against Sudan, it was China that sought to block 
them. That in turn encouraged calls by influential campaigners on the situation in Darfur 
to call for a boycott of the Beijing Olympics, to the embarrassment of China.
46
    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It may seem something of a contrivance to compare these two transitions, but memories 
of the past do live on, and there has been considerable discussion in Sudan in recent years 
of the earlier transition, not least because of the recognition of the importance of them 
both.  For whatever becomes of the present transition, Sudan is not now able to restore 
any of its past systems, not least because of the empowerment of the South which has 
already taken place: just as there was no going back on the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 
1953.
47
  And both transitions also define Sudan’s sovereignty for the indefinite future: in 
1955 it led to independence from Egypt on 1 January 1956; in 2011 it is intended to 
decide the future of the South. In the nineteenth century the Turco-Egyptian conquest 
carved out an area under its control from the Mediterranean almost to Lake Victoria.  In 
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the twentieth century Sudan rejected union with Egypt.  In the twenty-first century it is 
intended that Southern Sudan will decide if there will be three states in the Nile valley 
rather than two.  But whether as one state or two there will also be the question for 
Sudan, North and South, of whether it is possible to establish stable multi-party 
democracy at the fourth attempt. 
    
The last word, however, will belong not to me but to Bill Luce.  What he wrote in a letter 
to the Sudan Agent in December 1954 is as appropriate today in the midst of the present 
transition as it was then in the middle of the first one, ‘I am afraid I have given you a 
rather rambling account of these events, and have thrown in a good deal of crystal-
gazing, but it is difficult at the moment to try to size up with any real confidence which 
way things may go.  Anyway I hope you will have got some idea of how the situation 
appears to me at the moment.’48 
                                                 
 
48
 Luce to Lampen, 29 Dec. 1954, SAD 828/9/71. 
